Independent conditional clauses with argumentative function in Dutch by D’Hertefelt, Sarah & Van linden, An
 1 
 
This has been accepted by Text & Talk: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Language, Discourse 
& Communication Studies 
 
Please cite as: 
Sarah D’Hertefelt & An Van linden. Forthc. Independent conditional clauses with 
argumentative function in Dutch. Text & Talk: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Language, 







This study offers an analysis of independent conditional clauses (ICCs) that are used with 
argumentative functions in spoken Dutch. ICCs are used as arguments when they serve to 
motivate the speaker’s implied standpoint regarding a preceding propositional content, termed 
the trigger. Two basic types of argumentative ICCs can be distinguished, which are termed 
‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ arguments. Direct arguments express a contextually given premise on the 
basis of which a conclusion about the speaker’s standpoint regarding a preceding trigger can be 
drawn. Indirect arguments, by contrast, express a condition that – if it had held – would have 
warranted the conclusion, but its counterfactual interpretation resulting from hypothetical 
backshift signals that the speaker knows that this condition is not fulfilled, and hence that the 
implied standpoint regarding a trigger is not valid either. We argue that direct and indirect ICCs 
instantiate independent instances of epistemic non-predictive conditionals and hypothetical 
predictive conditionals (Dancygier 1993, 1998) respectively, and that they set up propositional-
logic arguments of different classic forms, i.e. the modus ponendo ponens form (direct ICCs) 
and the denying the antecedent form (indirect ICCs). However, they do not explicitly express 
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1. Introduction1 
This article deals with independent conditional clauses that are used with argumentative 
functions in spoken Dutch, as exemplified in (1) and (2). Studies discussing the structure type 
of conditional clauses that are not accompanied by a main clause have often taken a pragmatic 
perspective, focusing on the illocutionary or discourse functions of these structures. Examples 
include Boogaart and Verheij (2013) for Dutch, Weuster (1983), Oppenrieder (1989) and 
Günthner (1999) for German, Laury et al. (2013) for Finnish and Swedish, Stirling (1999), 
Panther and Thornburg (2003) and Kaltenböck (2016) for English, Patard (2014) for French, 
Vallauri (2004) for Italian, and Schwenter (2016) for Spanish. Evans and Watanabe (2016) also 
include contributions about non-Indo-European languages. In many of the more recent studies, 
these independent subordinate-marked clauses are described as instances of ‘insubordination’, 
i.e. the “conventionalized main clause use of what, on prima facie grounds, appear to be 
formally subordinate clauses” (Evans 2007: 367). The illocutionary or discourse functions that 
have been identified for such structures comprise the expression of requests (e.g. If you could 
open the window?), wishes (e.g. If only he could have seen this!), threats (e.g. If you dare touch 
my car…!), and evaluation (e.g. If a person can’t pass an opinion…) (see D’Hertefelt [2015] 
for a detailed description of these uses). However, in spite of the extensive existing literature 
on these constructionalized uses of independent conditional clauses, independent conditional 
clauses with argumentative functions like (1) and (2) so far appear to have largely escaped 
attention in the literature, with the exception of a brief discussion by Panther and Thornburg 
(2003: 140-141), who label such English structures as If that’s the way they want it as 
‘expressives’ (see D’Hertefelt 2015).2  
In (1), two speakers converse about their experiences at cash desks in American 
supermarkets, where poorly paid employees – typically pensioners – put your groceries in bags, 
and, if requested, carry them to your car. Speaker A says it is common to give a one-dollar tip 
for the carrier service, while the packing service is generally not rewarded. 
 
(1) A: ’k heb ze ook wel ’ns bij de kassa dollar gegeven hoor ’k zeg nou je hoeft 
 niet mee te lopen         [trigger] 
  I’ve also given them a dollar at the cash desk;  I said “now, you don’t have to  
  walk with me” 
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B: ja zou dat ’t enige zijn wat ze verdienen dan   
 yes, would that be the only money they make then? 
A: het zijn gepensioneerden         
 they’re pensioners 
hebben alleen 't pensioentje   
only have a small pension 
[…] 
A: ze moeten [het] ook echt van de fooi hebben    
 they really have to rely on the tip 
[…] 
A:  nou ik voel me wel ’ns bezwaard 
well, I sometimes feel troubled 
denk je van je loep je loopt daar zoals een luxe tante   
then you think you are walking there like some sort of posh lady 
B: ja 
 yes 
A:  alsof je zelf je boodschappen niet kunt dragen    
as if you can’t carry your groceries yourself 
maar ja  als  ’t  hun  inkomen  is  
but yes COND  it their  income  be.3SG.PRS 
‘but well, if it’s their income’ 
B:  ja.    
 yes        
(CGN)3 
 
Example (2) is excerpted from a conversation between a young couple about another couple, 
i.e. Speaker A’s sister and her partner. That partner recently got a new job for which he 
sometimes has to work in the weekend. 
 
(2) A: ja maar ‘k denk dat ze wel weer kwaad was gisteren  
 [trigger] 
yeah but I think she was angry again yesterday 
B:  ja maar hij heeft dat toch niet veel gedaan 




als dat nu elke week zou zijn dat hij de  
COND  DEM PRT  every week would be.INF that he the 
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zaterdag de zondag moet   werken en
 Saturday the Sunday have.to.3SG.PRS work.INF and 
zo 
like.that 
‘if he had to work Saturdays and Sundays every week, that kind of thing’ 
A:  nee nee dat is uh hm 
no no that’s erm 
B: maar moet ie daar in de fabriek zelf zitten of zo of moet ie moet ie ergens  
 naartoe          
 but does he have to be in the factory or does he have to go somewhere else? 
(CGN) 
 
The independent conditional clauses (henceforth ICCs) marked in bold in (1) and (2) can be 
considered arguments because they motivate the speaker’s4 standpoint regarding a (set of) 
proposition(s) from the preceding discourse, which we call ‘trigger’, as indicated in the 
examples. However, since these conditional clauses lack a main clause, the actual standpoint 
they defend is not explicitly expressed. Rather, argumentative ICCs orient the addressee’s 
attention towards an implied conclusion concerning the speaker’s standpoint, a conclusion 
which the addressee has to draw on their own. In (1) the ICC functions as an argument 
motivating the speaker’s implied approval or acceptance of the trigger: ‘if it’s these people’s 
income, [then it’s okay that they carry my groceries to my car]’. Speakers use ICCs like (1) to 
express a ‘given’ assumption in conditional form. In (2), the ICC functions as an argument 
motivating the speaker’s implied disapproval or rejection of the trigger. In addition, (2) is 
different from (1) in that it involves an extra step in the argumentation by virtue of its 
counterfactual nature, marked by the future-in-the-past form zou zijn (literally ‘would be’). 
Specifically, the speaker expresses a condition that – if it had held – would have warranted the 
conclusion (implied acceptance of the trigger), but its counterfactual interpretation resulting 
from hypothetical backshift (cf. Dancygier 1993, 1998) – which is absent in (1) – indicates that 
the speaker knows that this condition is not fulfilled, and hence that the implied standpoint of 
acceptance is not valid either. The argumentative ICC in (2) thus implies: ‘if it were the case 
that he has to work weekends every week, then it would be understandable that she was angry; 
however, since he does not have to work weekends every week, she has no reason to be angry’. 
Because of the extra step involved in the argumentation in structures involving hypothetical 
backshift, like (2), these will be called ‘indirect’ arguments. Structures without hypothetical 
backshift like (1) will be called ‘direct’ arguments. 
The structure of this article is as follows. Sections 2 and 3 will offer descriptive analyses 
of the two basic types of argumentative ICCs that can be distinguished in Dutch, i.e. direct (1) 
and indirect arguments (2) respectively. We will discuss their semantic and pragmatic 
properties, as well as their argumentative orientation. In the process, attention will be paid to 
the conversational dynamics of the discourse and the rhetorical effects the two types of ICC 
may have. The distinction between the two types will be informed by Dancygier’s (1993, 1998) 
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typology of conditionals. Direct arguments will be argued to instantiate independent instances 
of non-predictive – epistemic – conditionals, while indirect arguments will be analyzed as 
independent instances of predictive – hypothetical – conditionals (Dancygier 1993, 1998). In 
Section 4, the two argument types will be related to reasoning patterns of propositional logic. 
We will argue that direct arguments are interpreted to set up an argument of the modus 
(ponendo) ponens form, while indirect arguments set up the argumentative form of denying the 
antecedent, which is considered a fallacy within formal logic, but can still have legitimate uses 
within informal logic insofar as “the argument provides some reason for its conclusion” (Duarte 
d’Almeida and MacDonald 2016: 36-37; emphasis original). Finally, Section 5 will recapitulate 
our major findings and present some questions for further research. 
The data on which this study is based come from the Corpus Gesproken Nederlands (CGN, 
‘Spoken Dutch Corpus’), and to a lesser extent from a personal corpus of internet material (IC). 
The relevant examples were retrieved by using both general queries (specifying turn-initial 
position of als ‘if’) and lexically more specific queries (including maar ja als ‘but well, if’, cf. 
[1]), and were drawn either from the CGN sub-corpora comprising (multi-speaker) dialogues 
or from such interactive webpages as blogs and fora, which are taken to contain data that come 
close to spontaneous spoken discourse. In total, a set of 20 argumentative ICCs were studied in 
detail, which included 14 direct and 6 indirect arguments. In general, D’Hertefelt’s (2015) 
exploratory study unearthed far fewer argumentative uses of ICCs than constructionalized uses 
like wishes and requests. Nevertheless, our native speaker intuitions suggest that both types of 
argumentative ICCs are productive in Dutch, especially in colloquial language use. 
 
2. Direct argumentative ICCs 
 
Direct argumentative ICCs serve to motivate the speaker’s implied acceptance of something 
that was said in the preceding discourse. They thus function as pro-arguments with respect to a 
preceding trigger, cf. (1). More examples are given in (3) and (4). In (3), the speaker talks about 
their experiences in booking first-class tickets for a show by the Tiroler band Kastelruther 
Spatzen, which turn out to be surprisingly expensive, especially in view of the limited number 
of people on stage (about six performers). This show is then compared to the Holiday On Ice 
show. In (4), three friends are talking about a fourth friend, Madelon, who has been laid off and 
is still unemployed.  
 
(3) […]  ik moet eerlijk zeggen bij Holiday On Ice ben je ook veel geld kwijt     [trigger] 
I have to admit, if you go to Holiday On Ice you also have to pay a lot of money 
maar ja als je ook ziet  hoeveel mensen daar 
but yes COND 2SG also see.2SG.PRS how.many people  there 
op ’t podium staan 
on  the stage  stand.3PL.PRS 






(4) A: dus nu is ze hard op zoek ook   
so now she’s very busy looking [for work], too 
B: dus daarom heb ik dus ook uh de vakantie even nog niet geboekt want uh ja wij 
 wouden eigenlijk wat verder                    [trigger] 
so that’s why I haven’t booked erm the holiday yet because erm yes we 
 wanted to go [on holiday] a bit further afield 
maa ja als Madelon geen werk heeft 
but yes COND Madelon no job have.3SG.PRS 
‘but well, if Madelon doesn’t have a job’ 
A: oh dat zei je ja        
 oh, that’s what you said, yes 
(CGN) 
 
In (3), the ICC motivates the speaker’s implied acceptance of the trigger: the high number of 
people involved in the Holiday On Ice show makes it acceptable that the tickets for the show 
are expensive. The same goes for (4): the fact that Madelon does not have a job motivates why 
B has postponed booking tickets for their holiday so far. 
The unexpressed conclusion of direct argumentative ICCs always involves a type of 
attitudinal evaluation, i.e. the speaker’s assessment towards the situation referred to in the 
trigger (cf. Van linden [2012:  ch. 2] on modal-evaluative meaning). The speaker’s very use of 
a direct argument signals that they feel that their standpoint is somehow controversial; if this 
were not the case, an argument would hardly be needed (cf. van Eemeren et al. [1996: 5] on the 
controversiality typically associated with arguments). The trigger typically refers to something 
the speaker evaluates negatively (e.g. as unethical, unpleasant, or unexpected). The speaker’s 
implied acceptance of the trigger is observed to be inspired by different types of attitudinal 
assessments; the specific type depends on the content of both the trigger and ICC. In (1), the 
trigger concerns Speaker A’s practice of a behavior (‘I paid pensioners to carry my groceries to 
my car’) that is evaluated negatively by the same speaker, as it sometimes makes A feel 
troubled. Speaker A uses the ICC to clear their conscience: ‘if it’s the pensioner’s income [then 
it’s morally acceptable that I have them carry my groceries to my car]’. The implied standpoint 
in (1) thus is deontic in nature (as defined by Nuyts et al. [2010], with deontic qualification 
pertaining to both potential SoAs and propositional contents presupposed true; see Van linden 
and Verstraete [2011] for an alternative view). By contrast, the implied standpoint in (3) is 
mainly based on market-economic principles. The trigger refers to the high price of the tickets 
for Holiday On Ice; high prices are generally regarded as unpleasant (this negative evaluation 
is not explicitly expressed). Therefore, implied acceptance of the organizers of the show setting 
high prices needs extra back-up in the form of an ICC; the high number of performers renders 
it economically justifiable that tickets are expensive.5 In (4), the trigger refers to the fact that 
Speaker B has so far refrained from booking holiday tickets. B’s implied standpoint is an 
attitudinal assessment in terms of likeability (also termed ‘boulomaic modality’ in Nuyts 2005, 
2006): although B may think it is unpleasant that they have not booked tickets yet, the reason 
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behind this – Madelon’s unemployment – makes this unpleasant fact bearable, or boulomaically 
acceptable. The examples thus indicate that it is the specific content of both the trigger and the 
ICC that determine the nature of the attitudinal assessment that is implied by the ICC and left 
to be inferred by the addressee. 
In examples (1), (3) and (4) the trigger and ICC are produced by the same speaker, but this 
need not be the case. Consider example (5), in which A has just told B about going through 
extreme emotional states while seeing everything in colors in a marijuana-induced trip. Note 
that the trigger is produced by A, while the ICC is uttered by B. 
 
(5) A: maar pas op daarvoor heb 'k ik uh denk drie vier weken eigenlijk bijna niks  
 gesmoord          [start trigger] 
but hold on, before that [i.e. the marijuana-induced trip] I had hardly been 
smoking marijuana, erm, I think for three or four weeks 
B: mmm   
 mmm 
A: in de week of zo hè 
during the week, that is 
B: ja   
 yes 
A: pff   
 pff 
niks   
nothing 
na gewoon van uh geen goesting niet meer hebben    [end trigger] 
well just because I didn’t feel like it anymore 
 
B: maar ja als ge bezig zijt  overdag  
but yes COND 2SG busy be.2SG.PRS during.the.day 
‘but well, if you’re busy during the day’ 
A: ja maar ja   
yes but, well 
B: hebt gij dat  
 did you [experience] this? 
allee bij mij was dat toch uh        
 well, this is what I experienced, anyway 
(CGN) 
 
In (5), the trigger refers to A’s achievement of not having smoked marijuana for a couple of 
weeks. A evaluates this achievement as unexpected, as is evident from the interjection pas op 
‘beware; hold on’. Speaker B uses an ICC to express their implied acceptance of A’s 
achievement, but at the same time the ICC also rebuts A’s evaluation of their own achievement 
as unexpected: ‘if you’re busy during the day [then it’s (to be) expected (or unsurprising) that 
you do not feel like smoking marijuana, and hence that you managed to refrain from doing so 
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for about four weeks]’. Both A’s and B’s (implied) standpoints assess the trigger proposition in 
terms of mirativity, which involves the expression of both speaker surprise (Delancey 2001: 
369) (A’s utterance) and its opposite meaning, i.e. lack of surprise (B’s utterance) (cf. Simon-
Vandenbergen and Aijmer 2007: 37; Gentens et al. 2016; Van linden et al. 2016). More 
generally, different-speaker direct arguments express concurrence with the interlocutor on the 
propositional content of the trigger, but at the same time also express disagreement with regard 
to their interlocutor’s (implied) evaluation of that content. They thus form mainly cooperative 
reactions to their interlocutor’s turn. In single-speaker direct argumentative ICCs, by contrast, 
there is not any disagreement; the ICC allows the speaker to come out with a nuanced stance 
towards the trigger proposition. 
Irrespective of the type of attitudinal assessment invoked by the ICC and the (non-)identity 
of the speakers producing the trigger and ICC, all direct arguments function in a similar fashion, 
which can schematically be represented as in Figure 1 (based on example (1)).   
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
In this schema, the arrows pointing in opposite directions illustrate the contrast between the 
speaker’s implied (controversial) standpoint the ICC orients to, and the ‘uncontroversial’ 
standpoint that is in line with the explicit or implicit evaluation of the trigger. This contrast is 
typically made explicit with the combination maar ja ‘but well’ preceding the ICC, which is a 
combination of the adversative coordinator maar ‘but’ and the interjection ja ‘yes; well’.  
As can be gathered from the paraphrases given for the examples of direct ICCs, these 
constructions do not express conditional relations in the content domain in the sense of Sweetser 
(1990), in which the protasis expresses an assumption on the basis of which the speaker arrives 
at a prediction conveyed in the apodosis (with sequential and causal relations between p and q, 
e.g. If it rains, the match will be canceled). Rather, they express assumptions on the basis of 
which conclusions can be drawn, and thus instantiate independent instances of non-predictive 
conditionals, specifically of the epistemic or ‘inferential’ type (Dancygier 1993: 423-426, 1998: 
86-88; Sweetser 1990: 116). An important difference between predictive and non-predictive 
conditionals relates to the use of verb forms. While predictive ones show backshift (see Section 
3), non-predictive conditionals are not backshifted, i.e., the verb forms refer to the time they 
indicate (cf. Dancygier 1993: 405). All the examples given above show present-tense marked 
verb phrases that have present time reference; they refer to assumptions that hold at the time of 
utterance. (Note that in predictive conditionals like If it rains, the match will be canceled, the 
protasis refers to the future but indicates the present, cf. Dancygier [1993: 405-406].) Yet, these 
assumptions are not presented by the speaker as known to them, but they are marked as 
‘epistemic distance’ between speaker and content. The kind of unassertability signaled in 
epistemic conditionals thus is that the speaker does not take the responsibility for asserting p. 
In the examples, the degree of epistemic distance marked by the non-predictive protases is 
rather low. In (1) and (4), the ICC refers to information that the speaker had already explicitly 
asserted in the preceding discourse, and thus clearly belongs to the common ground (cf. Clark 
1996). In (3), it has not been mentioned in the preceding discourse how many people are on 
stage in Holiday On Ice shows, but the speaker assumes that the addressee has access to that 
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information. In (5), the degree of epistemic distance may be somewhat higher, as the ICC refers 
to information that the addressee has privileged access to (how the addressee spends the day). 
The ‘contextual givenness’ of direct argumentative ICCs will become even more clear in 
Section 4, in which a parallel is drawn with arguments of the classic modus ponens form.  
 
3. Indirect argumentative ICCs 
 
While direct argumentative ICCs are used to motivate the speaker’s implied acceptance of a 
preceding trigger, indirect arguments are used to motivate the speaker’s implied rejection of a 
trigger, as in (2), or their acceptance of a trigger containing a negative evaluation, as in (11) 
below. Another example (10) is given, in which Speaker A is telling Speaker B about her three 
grandchildren. The excerpt focuses on the middle one called Lies, who – to A’s mind – has 
always been lagging behind her fellow preschoolers.  
 
(10) A: en dat was zo meer ja ggg ja die CLB’s die dan zeiden van uhm ja stuurt ze toch 
maar naar ’t eerste studiejaar               [trigger] 
and it was more like yes ggg yes those CLBs [Pupil Guidance Centres] they said 
ehm yes do send her to first grade anyway 
[…] 
ze is echt gemotiveerd   
she’s really motivated 
ze is nen doorzetter   
she’s a go-getter 
enzovoort enzovoort   
and so on and so on 
B: ja   
 yes 
A: maar het blijft dus wel wel uh ja ja het blijft een vraag  
 but it still remains, well well ehm yes yes, it still remains a question 
[…] 
ze faalt wel veel hè   
she does fail a lot, doesn’t she 
allee ja ik bedoel ze ziet ook wel dat ze zo zo goed niet is als de anderen hè   
well I mean, she also realizes she’s not as good as the others, doesn’t she? 
B: ja   
 yes 
ge moet ze dus eigenlijk ggg begeleiden   
so you have to ggg guide her 
[…] 
A: het is zo ja zo een klein meisje nog   
 she’s still such a small girl 
’t is zo echt nog zo een heel klein meisje hè 
she really still is such a very little girl, isn’t she 
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B: ja   
 yes 
xxx ja ja ja ja   
xxx yes yes yes 
A:  ggg uh als dat nu nog zo uh een grote  
COND DEM PRT still such  INTERJ a big   
flinke zou  zijn 
 tough would.3SG be.INF 
‘ggg if at least she were big and tough’ 
B:  ja ja ja 
 yes yes yes 
A:  maar ’t is zo’n klein dun ding 
but she’s such a little thin thing 
(CGN) 
 
In (10), the trigger refers to a reported directive speech act: the Pupil Guidance Centres told 
Speaker A’s daughter to send her daughter Lies to first grade. The ICC is used to motivate 
Speaker A’s implied disapproval of this recommendation, i.e. she thinks it had better not be 
complied with, as Lies still is a little thin girl.  
An important feature of indirect ICCs is that – unlike direct ICCs – they are backshifted, 
i.e. “the time reference intended by the speaker is systematically later than the time referred to 
by the verb form in its prototypical (non-conditional) uses” (Dancygier 1993: 406; emphasis in 
original), which is characteristic of predictive conditionals as opposed to non-predictive ones. 
Crucially, indirect arguments involve hypothetical backshifting, showing either weak 
hypothetical forms like the future-in-the-past form zou zijn (literally ‘would be’) in (2) and (10), 
or strong hypothetical forms like the future-in-the-past perfect form gelegen zou hebben 
(literally ‘would have lain’) in (14) (see Section 4) and the past perfect was gebleven (literally 
‘had stayed’) in (11).6 While direct arguments can be analyzed as contextually given 
assumptions, indirect ones cannot be interpreted as assumptions, not even provisional ones. 
They can only be entertained as hypotheses, as the speaker holds other assumptions that 
contradict the assumption in p (Dancygier 1993: 409, 1998: 50). Strong hypothetical forms 
indicate that the counterevidence the speaker chooses to ignore in making a prediction is very 
strong. In fact, they represent the possibility that p holds as completely excluded, and thus signal 
that the prediction in the apodosis is not valid. The weak hypothetical forms used in the 
examples here refer to the present rather than the future – they show state verbs rather than 
event verbs – and hence also indicate that the counterevidence is very strong. Because of their 
counterfactual interpretation, indirect arguments are double-layered. At the primary 
(‘propositional’) level, the ICC in (10) refers to a potential SoA that – if it had held – would 
have been a pro-argument with respect to the trigger: ‘if Lies is big and tough [then it’s okay to 
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send her to first grade]’. Therefore, at this level the ICC orients towards an expected or 
uncontroversial standpoint in the conclusion, i.e. compliance with a well-intended 
recommendation. At the counterfactual level, however, the hypothetical backshift in the ICC 
signals that the speaker knows that ‘Lies is not big and tough’, but that she is still a little thin 
girl, as she comments in the turns preceding and following the ICC. The counterfactual layer 
thus inverts the argument towards the opposite conclusion, i.e. implied disapproval of the 
trigger. Indirect counter-arguments like (10) can be schematically represented as in Figure 2.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
   
Hypothetical backshifting exactly signals the existence of counterevidence to the 
addressee, who may not share the speaker’s knowledge (Dancygier 1993: 410). This forms 
another difference with direct argumentative ICCs, which are contextually given. Indirect 
arguments need not be contextually given (this is nevertheless the case in [10]); they may as 
well rely on information that is accessible to the speaker only, which is the case in (11). Up to 
the occurrence of the ICC in (11), the speaker has not mentioned how many things had gone 
wrong with her general practitioner. Indirect argumentative ICCs may thus present information 
that is new to the addressee. 
While the ICC in (10) functions as a counter-argument, indirect arguments may as well 
function as pro-arguments, like (11). In such cases, the ICC motivates a negative evaluation 
contained in the trigger proposition. (11) is taken from a webpage entitled ‘The importance of 
a good general practitioner’ (GP).    
 
(11) Mijn vorige huisarts was niet alleen minder slim – ze wist ook minder van het menselijk 
lichaam dan ikzelf. En dat is irritant. Tevens gevaarlijk.              [trigger]            
My previous general practitioner was not only less smart – she also knew less about the 
human body than I do. And that’s irritating. And dangerous at the same time. 
[… anecdote about an error made by the doctor, who had prescribed a double dose of 
tetanus vaccine for the speaker’s baby]  
Nu weet ik niet wat precies het effect is van 2x zoveel Tetanusvaccin in je baby’s 
minidonder, maar ik werd niet bepaald gelukkig van het idee.  
Well, I’m not sure what the precise effect is of a double dose of tetanus vaccine in your 
baby’s minibody, but the idea didn’t exactly make me happy. 
En als het daar nu bij was gebleven... maar […] 
and COND it there PRT with be.3SG.PST stay.PAPA but 
‘And if at least that had been all… but […]’ 
[… anecdote about another error made by the same doctor] 
 (http://groenevrouw.nl/het-belang-van-een-goede-huisarts/, 18/03/2015)  
 
Within the line of argumentation developed in (11), the ICC functions as an argument in favor 
of the speaker’s claims outlined in the trigger, i.e. that her GP is less competent than herself 
(who is not trained in medicine), and that this is irritating and dangerous. The argument thus 
serves to motivate a negative evaluation of a person’s competence and of a situation. Like (10), 
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(11) is double-layered: at the propositional level, the ICC refers to an SoA that could have been 
a counter-argument with respect to the trigger: ‘if the GP hasn’t made any more mistakes, then 
perhaps the GP isn’t so bad after all, and the situation is not that irritating or dangerous’. 
Consequently, at this level the ICC orients towards a more or less expected or uncontroversial 
standpoint, i.e. disapproval of a trigger involving a negative evaluation. Again, the hypothetical 
backshift indicates that the speaker knows that ‘this has not been all’, but that the GP has been 
making more mistakes, which is substantiated in the speaker’s next anecdote. The speaker thus 
signals that the negative evaluation of the GP and the situation cannot be redeemed, and the 
ICC functions as an argument in favor of the speaker’s implied acceptance of this trigger. 
Schematically, indirect pro-arguments can be represented as in Figure 3. Although indirect 
argumentative ICCs can be used to express both pro-arguments (11) and counter-arguments 
(10), the speaker’s implied standpoint generally has negative semantic prosody (cf. Sinclair 
2004; Morley and Partington 2009), either because it rejects the trigger proposition (counter-
arguments) or because it supports a negative evaluation of a person or situation (pro-
arguments). 
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
In the examples given so far the trigger and ICC are uttered by the same speaker (11), by 
different interlocutors (2), and by the same speaker who represents speech produced by a 
different speaker (10). While in single-speaker direct arguments the speaker is taking a nuanced 
stance on the trigger proposition, in single-speaker indirect arguments like (11), the speaker is 
far less subtle and sophisticated. This is why in examples like (10), in which the speaker 
incorporates someone else’s speech in the trigger, the indirect argument orients towards quite 
unsubtle disagreement with the represented speaker. In the different-speaker example in (2) 
above, the speaker uses the ICC to condemn the behavior of the she-person referred to in the 
trigger (‘since her partner doesn’t have to work weekends every week, [it’s not understandable 
that she’s angry]’). The ICC in (2) might be interpreted to fuel an argument between Speakers 
A and B. Speaker A (producing the trigger) is the sister of the she-person whose anger is 
frowned upon by Speaker B (producing the ICC). B might have uttered the ICC to pre-empt 
protest from A (his partner), who could have decided to defend her sister. Of course, this need 
not be the case; A’s evaluation of her sister’s behavior may just as well have been the same as 
B’s. More generally, indirect argumentative ICCs lack the nuance characteristic of direct ones, 
and are hence potentially more aggressive in a conversation. As suggested by a referee, speakers 
use them to forestall any possible objection to their implied point of view, by pretending to be 
willing to go along with the trigger proposition (in the case of counter-arguments) or a rebuttal 
of a negative evaluation (in the case of pro-arguments) if a sufficient condition were fulfilled.   
The process of ‘counterfactual’ reversal typical of indirect arguments involves scalarity, 
which is formally reflected. The argument on the propositional level that is inverted or ‘negated’ 
by the counterfactual interpretation always refers to what the speaker considers to be a sufficient 
condition for the negated (uncontroversial) standpoint. For instance, in example (11), one could 
think of a number of arguments against the trigger like ‘she apologized for her mistakes, she 
made these mistakes because she was temporarily very confused …’. However, the condition 
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that no new mistakes were made is taken as a sufficient condition for the speaker’s disapproval 
of the trigger: fulfilment of this condition already suffices for the speaker to reconsider their 
negative evaluation. The hypothetical backshift in the ICC indicates that the speaker knows that 
this sufficient condition is not fulfilled; hence, the negative evaluation in the trigger cannot be 
redeemed and the ICC orients towards approval of the trigger. This polarity reversal triggered 
by the scalar interpretation of the condition (i.e. as a sufficient one) equally applies to indirect 
counter-arguments (10). Formal reflection of this scalarity is found in the use of the scalar 
particle nog ‘still’ in (10), and in the use of scalar ‘at least’ in the English translations of (10) 
and (11). In (2), the time adverbial ‘every week’ sets up a scale of frequency of the weekend 
work that arouses anger in Speaker A’s sister. The clash between the propositional layer and 
the counterfactual layer is often formally expressed by the adversative conjunction maar ‘but’ 
introducing a statement that confirms the falsity of the propositional layer immediately 
following the indirect argument. Same-speaker examples (10) and (11) are cases in point. A 
final formal property of indirect arguments is that they are typically marked by the modal 
particle nu/nou.7 However, further research on this particle is needed to describe its use in 
indirect argumentative ICCs in more detail. 
   
4. Argumentative ICCs and propositional logic 
 
In the discussions in Sections 2 and 3 it became clear that together with the trigger proposition, 
argumentative ICCs set up arguments the conclusion of which is left to be inferred by the 
addressee. More specifically, we will argue that direct arguments launch reasoning patterns of 
the modus (ponendo) ponens form,8 while indirect arguments invoke the argumentative form 
of denying the antecedent. While the classic forms of such reasoning patterns of propositional 
logic always include a conclusion, this component is lacking in the arguments focused on here, 
as the argumentative conditional clauses are not accompanied by a main clause. 
As argued by van Eemeren et al. (1996: 14), not expressing the motivated standpoint is by 
no means exceptional in argumentation patterns. However, in argumentative ICCs this 
orientation towards an implied conclusion is constructionally present, because conditional 
protases (at least in preposed conditionals) always function as ‘stepping stones’ towards a 
possible conclusion (Harder 1997: 446). This ‘orienting’ property of argumentative ICCs is 




(12) alsof je zelf je boodschappen niet kunt dragen 
as if you can’t carry your groceries yourself 
a.  maar ja  als  ’t  hun  inkomen  is  
but yes COND  it their  income  be.3SG.PRS 
                                                      
7
 Note that nu/nou is not typical of backshifted predictive conditionals in general, but it is typical of indirect 
arguments. 
8
 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out the parallel between direct argumentative ICCs and classic 
arguments of the modus ponendo ponens form. 
 14 
 
‘but well, if it’s their income’ 
b. maar ja het is  hun inkomen 
 but yes it be.3SG.PRS their  income 
‘but well, it’s their income’ 
 
(13) A: ja maar ‘k denk dat ze wel weer kwaad was gisteren 
yeah but I think she was angry again yesterday  
B:  ja maar hij heeft dat toch niet veel gedaan 
Yes, but it’s not like he’s done that a lot 
a. als dat nu elke week zou zijn dat hij de 
 COND  DEM PRT  every week would be.INF that he the 
zaterdag de zondag moet werken en  
Saturday the Sunday has.to work.INF and 
zo 
like.that 
‘if he had to work Saturdays and Sundays every week, that kind of 
thing’ 
b. hij moet niet elke week de zaterdag de 
he has.to NEG  every week the Saturday the  
zondag werken 
Sunday work.INF 
‘he doesn’t have to work Saturdays and Sundays every week’ 
 
In (12a), the conditional subordinator als ‘if’ marks the construction explicitly as a premise, on 
the basis of which a specific conclusion concerning the speaker’s standpoint can be drawn. This 
orientation towards an implied speaker standpoint is not present in (12b). The same applies to 
the constructions in (13): in (13a), the conditional subordinator marks the construction as an 
assumption which leads to a prediction concerning the speaker’s standpoint; the hypothetical 
backshift makes it clear that this assumption does not hold and therefore implies the opposite 
of the predicted standpoint. In the non-conditional form of the argument in (13b), the speaker 
merely presents an argument against ‘her’ being angry, but without explicitly marking this 
argument as leading to a certain standpoint. Note that in the non-conditional form in (13b) 
negative polarity is explicitly marked, while in the conditional form in (13a) it is the 
counterfactual interpretation resulting from hypothetical backshifting that reverses the polarity 
value (see Section 3). 
Their shared conditional form thus makes direct and indirect argumentative ICCs very well 
suited to motivating speaker standpoints, because they explicitly orient the addressee’s attention 
towards a conclusion for the argument presented in the ICC. While in most cases the conclusion 
remains implied, we also found cases in which the conclusion is produced by either the 
addressee or the speaker who uttered the ICC, cf. (14) below. In (14), drawn from the single-
speaker sub-corpora of the CGN, a boy named Sander is watching a great fire destroying an old 
warehouse. Biking away from the fire, he gets a flat tire, and he finds that it is a hot dagger 




(14) vreemd dat die dolk zo heet is      [trigger] 
it’s strange that this dagger is so hot 
Als hij nu vlak bij  de  brand  gelegen zou hebben
 COND  he PRT  close by the fire lie.PAPA would have.INF
 had het gekund 
had it can.PAPA 
‘If it had lain close to the fire, it would have been possible.’ 
maar er liggen weilanden tussen de loods van Oevers en het fietspad 
but there are meadows in between the Oevers warehouse and the bike lane. 
(CGN) 
 
(14) does not instantiate an argumentative ICC, but rather a syntactically complete 
argumentative (predictive) conditional construction, in which the protasis expresses a condition 
that – if it had held – would have licensed the conclusion expressed in the apodosis. However, 
the backshifted verb form (gelegen zou hebben ‘would have lain’) signals that the speaker 
knows that this condition is not fulfilled, as explicitly mentioned in the next turn, and hence 
that the conclusion is not warranted either. That is, Sander still has no explanation for how this 
hot dagger came to lie on the bike lane. 
In structures without a main clause like the ICCs studied here, however, the addressee is 
not offered the conclusion concerning the speaker’s standpoint, but has to infer this on their 
own. In such cases, the use of a conditional structure functions as an ‘invitation’ towards the 
addressee to take up an active part in the speaker’s argumentative reasoning process. We found 
cases in which the addressee in fact does try to produce the conclusion. The use of an 
argumentative ICC therefore implies more addressee involvement than the use of syntactically 
complete constructions like (14). 
The two types of argumentative ICCs studied both leave the conclusion to be inferred by 
the addressee; yet they differ in the type of reasoning pattern they set up. This becomes 
especially clear if we cast them in terms of propositional logic. Direct argumentative ICCs 
evoke arguments of the classic modus ponens form, which has two premises. The first premise 
is the conditional claim that p implies q (p  q). The second premise is that p, the antecedent 
of the conditional claim, is true. Given the truth of these premises it can be logically deduced 
that q, the consequent of the conditional claim, must be true as well. Interestingly, Dancygier 
(1993: 427) already noted that analyses of conditionals based on material implication within 
propositional logic center on non-predictive epistemic conditionals rather than predictive ones. 
Direct argumentative ICCs, we argue, convey p in a modus ponens form, i.e. the antecedent in 
the conditional first premise, and at the same time function as the second premise, i.e. it is the 
case that p. That is, direct arguments express a ‘given’ assumption in conditional form. In 
logical arguments launched by direct ICCs, q is never fully explicitly expressed; it combines 
the propositional content of the trigger with the speaker’s attitudinal qualification of it that is 
implied by the construction-in-context. In (15) we apply the modus ponens form to example 




(15) p  q  If [it is these persons’ income]p, then [it is morally acceptable that I  
  have them carry my groceries to my car]q 
If [Socrates is a man]p, then [Socrates is mortal]q 
 p  It is these persons’ income 
    Socrates is a man 
Hence, q Hence, it is morally acceptable that I have them carry my groceries to  
  my car 
   Hence, Socrates is mortal 
 
While in formal logic arguments are evaluated in terms of validity and soundness – the classic 
example in (15) is both valid and sound – and consist of propositions that refer to verifiable 
claims, in everyday language use speakers are more concerned with expressing their stance, 
and they use direct argumentative ICCs to motivate certain attitudinal assessments, i.e. 
interpretations rather than verifiable claims. Importantly, such direct arguments are much more 
economical than the full-blown classic arguments. A mere conditional clause, unaccompanied 
by a main clause, suffices to have a stretch of the preceding discourse (i.e. the trigger) 
interpreted as part of (i) the consequent of a conditional claim and (ii) the conclusion of a modus 
ponens form of argument, specifically as the propositional content that is qualified by the 
speaker’s (implied) attitudinal assessment.  
Indirect argumentative ICCs, by contrast, set up a different pattern of propositional logic, 
i.e. the argumentative form of denying the antecedent. Just like the modus ponens form, it has 
two premises, the first of which is the conditional claim that p implies q (p  q). The second 
premise, however, is that p is not true. From these two premises it is inferred that q is not true 
either. Indirect argumentative ICCs, we contend, convey the denial of p – through a backshifted 
predictive protasis – in a formally invalid argument, and orient to the conclusion that q does not 
hold either. As characteristic of ICCs, q is never fully explicitly expressed. In the case of pro-
arguments, q is interpreted to be the opposite of the negative evaluation coded in the trigger. In 
the case of counter-arguments, q combines the propositional content of the trigger with the 
speaker’s attitudinal qualification of it that is implied by the construction-in-context. In (16) we 
restate example (2) in terms of the propositional form of denying the antecedent. Two classic 
examples are included as well (in italics). 
 
(16) p  q   If [he has to work weekends every week]p, then [it is 
understandable that she is angry]q 
(a) If [Socrates is a man]p, then [Socrates is mortal]q 
(b) If [it barks]p, then [it is a dog]q 
 Not p (¬p)  He does not have to work weekends every week 
(a) Socrates is not a man 
(b) It doesn’t bark 
Hence, not q (¬q) Hence, it is not understandable that she is angry 
(a) Hence, Socrates is not mortal 




Arguments like these are invalid in formal logic, because the truth of the premises does not 
guarantee the truth of the conclusion. While the fallacy is most obvious for (16a), as its 
conclusion is clearly false, it is less clear for (16b), since its conclusion may seem to be true. 
However, within informal logic arguments of denying the antecedent form can still have 
legitimate uses to the extent that “the argument provides some reason for its conclusion” 
(Duarte d’Almeida and MacDonald 2016: 36-37; emphasis in original). And this is exactly what 
the indirect argumentative ICCs do in the everyday language examples we have come across 
so far, which – to our minds – present convincing arguments; they do not strike us as fallacies. 
In (2), rewritten in (16), the argument set up by the ICC provides some reason for speaker B’s 
lack of understanding of the she-person’s anger referred to in the trigger, but there may be other 
reasons as well (which are not considered). At the same time, the indirect argument rebuts just 
one line of argumentation, but not all potential arguments for a different conclusion. It suggests 
that one sufficient condition is not fulfilled, but there might be others. Imagine that the she-
person got angry because people had insulted her on the basis of her ethnic background. In that 
case, speaker B may not have shown a similar lack of understanding. If we apply this to (10), 
we can see that the speaker’s indirect argument targets only one of several potential arguments 
about the reported recommendation to send Lies to first grade. As suggested by one of the 
anonymous referees, one might imagine an argument to the effect that since her two best friends 
of the same age start school, then – even if she is small and insecure – it would be cruel not to 
send her to first grade together with them. Crucially, that argument has not been invalidated by 
the speaker’s indirect argument produced in (10). 
The way the argumentative ICCs compare to classic forms of propositional logic nicely 
supports Mercier and Sperber’s (2011) claim that humans do not reason to improve knowledge 
and make better decisions, but that the function of reasoning is basically argumentative. 
Humans, who by evolution are more dependent on communication and more vulnerable to 
miscommunication than any other species, reason to devise and evaluate arguments that serve 
to convince their fellow humans of their views, rather than to find the truth. The observation 
that we needed to include the speaker’s (implied) attitudinal qualification to restate the ICCs as 
classic arguments in (15) and (16) substantiates Mercier and Sperber’s (2011) claim. 
Conversely, their claim – which is backed up by different sorts of experimental evidence – lends 
support to the importance we attach to attitudinal qualification and semantic prosody in our 




This article aimed to present a descriptive analysis of a hitherto undescribed type of independent 
conditional clauses, and thereby to extend the inventory of independent conditional clauses that 
has been developed in the literature. We have shown that ICCs in Dutch can be used for 
argumentative purposes, and we distinguished between two subtypes of argumentative ICCs. 
Direct arguments express a ‘given’ premise on the basis of which a conclusion about the 
speaker’s standpoint regarding a preceding trigger can be drawn. Indirect arguments, by 
contrast, formulate an assumption on the basis of which a particular conclusion concerning the 
speaker’s standpoint could have been made. The hypothetical backshift that is typical of this 
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construction type signals the existence of strong counterevidence to the assumption, so that an 
opposite conclusion is implied. While direct arguments are single-layered, indirect ones involve 
two layers, a propositional one and a counterfactual one. 
The two types of argumentative ICCs were also shown to differ in terms of argumentative 
orientation. Whereas direct arguments function as pro-arguments, motivating the speaker’s 
implied approval or acceptance of the preceding trigger, indirect arguments can also function 
as counter-arguments, motivating the speaker’s implied disapproval or rejection of the trigger. 
The implied conclusions (acceptance versus rejection) were shown to be inspired by attitudinal 
assessments of various kinds, depending on the contents of the trigger and ICC (e.g. deontic, 
mirative, or boulomaic). Indirect arguments can also function as pro-arguments. In this use they 
nevertheless orient towards a conclusion that involves a negative evaluation, so that in general 
indirect arguments were argued to show negative semantic prosody. By focusing on the 
interactional dynamics of the discourse, tracing whether the interlocutors producing the trigger 
and the ICC were identical or not, we were able to point to several rhetorical effects of the two 
argument types.  
Invoking Dancygier’s (1993, 1998) typology of conditionals, we proposed that the 
semantic and pragmatic differences between the two argument types emanate from them 
realizing protases of different types of conditional constructions. Direct arguments were 
analyzed as independent instances of epistemic non-predictive conditionals, while indirect 
arguments were argued to instantiate independent instances of hypothetical predictive 
conditionals (Dancygier 1993, 1998). Table 1 brings together the main features discussed in 
Sections 2 and 3.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Putting the contrast between direct and indirect arguments even more sharply, we made an 
excursion to the domain of propositional logic, and argued that – together with the propositional 
content in the trigger – the former are interpreted to launch an argument of the modus ponendo 
ponens form, whereas the latter set up the argumentative form of denying the antecedent, which 
is a formally fallacious type, but is recuperated within informal logic as a legitimate argument 
form on the condition that it offers some reason for its conclusion (cf. Duarte d’Almeida and 
MacDonald 2016: 36-37). This analysis allowed us to explain the observation that indirect 
arguments – in the propositional layer – refer to a condition that is sufficient for acceptance 
(which is reflected in the presence of scalar elements) and that they hence target only one line 
of argumentation for rebuttal, leaving an open set of other arguments invalidated.  
An important difference with the conditional constructions focused on in Dancygier (1993, 
1998) and with the classic argumentative forms is that in the constructions studied here the 
conclusion is never explicitly expressed, as the argumentative ICCs lack main clauses. Their 
conditional form orients towards a particular conclusion regarding the speaker’s standpoint, but 
leaves it to be inferred by the addressee. This is why we argued that the use of independent 
conditionals to express an argument implies more addressee involvement than syntactically 
complete conditionals or classic proposition-logic argument forms.  
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While this article focused on Dutch data, D’Hertefelt (2015) has observed that the two 
argument types studied are observable in Swedish and English as well; her German data 
included direct arguments only. We propose that our descriptions of the semantic and pragmatic 
properties of direct and indirect argumentative ICCs, as well as their links with argumentative 
forms used in formal and informal logic apply to these other Germanic languages equally. 
Finally, this study also raises a number of questions for further research. D’Hertefelt (2015) 
has encountered argumentative ICCs in a number of Germanic languages, but so far these 
argumentative functions have not been described for any of the Romance languages for which 
descriptions of independent conditionals are available, or any non-European language. 
Therefore, further exploration is needed to check the cross-linguistic availability of this 
argumentative strategy.  
Another question which we have not tackled here concerns the theoretical status of the 
constructions studied, i.e. whether argumentative ICCs can be considered instances of 
conditional ‘insubordination’. Insubordinated constructions use markers normally associated 
with subordination, but function as independent clauses (Evans 2007: 367). At first sight our 
data seem to be cases in point, since they are marked as subordinate by the conditional 
subordinator als and verb-final word order, but they occur without an accompanying main 
clause. However, in contrast to the better-described instances of ICCs, like requests or wishes, 
it is hard to posit conventionalized meanings for argumentative ICCs; these seem to be highly 
schematic and – with indirect arguments – also depend on the argumentative orientation. The 
context of the ICC, especially the trigger, is crucial to the more specific meaning of the ICC, 
and would have to be integrated in its larger constructional template. Because of their reliance 
on context we believe that argumentative ICCs are less ‘independent’ than more 
constructionalized instances of conditional insubordination. D’Hertefelt and Verstraete (2014) 
have shown for independent complement clauses that not all these constructions are instances 
of insubordination, but that there is an alternative mechanism that leads to ‘independent’ 
subordinate clauses alike, i.e. the mechanism of dependency shift. We think a similar study on 
independent conditional clauses is needed, since it would add to both our understanding of 
insubordination and related mechanisms, and to our knowledge of how different uses of 
independent conditional clauses relate to each other.  
 
List of abbreviations 
2   second person 
3   third person 
COND  conditional 
DEM  demonstrative 
INF   infinitive 
INTERJ interjection 
NEG  negation 
PAPA  past participle 
PL   plural 
PRS   present 
PRT   particle 
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SG   singular 
 
Corpus 
CGN, Corpus Gesproken Nederlands (‘Spoken Dutch Corpus’). Nederlandse Taalunie. More 
information online at http://lands.let.ru.nl/cgn/ (Jan 20 2017).  
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Figure 1: Schematic representation of direct arguments  
  
‘Uncontroversial’ speaker standpoint: 
Rejection of T 
 
Implied speaker standpoint: 
− Acceptance of T  
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Figure 2: Schematic representation of indirect counter-arguments 
  
Uncontroversial speaker standpoint:  
Acceptance of T 
Compliance with T 
Implied speaker standpoint: 
Rejection of T 




TRIGGER (T): My previous GP was not competent (or less competent than a 
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Figure 3: Schematic representation of indirect pro-arguments 
  
Uncontroversial speaker standpoint:  
Rejection of T 
 
Implied speaker standpoint: 
Acceptance of T 
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Table 1: Differences between two types of ICCs informed by Dancygier’s (1993, 1998) 
typology 
 





Interpretation of verb forms No backshift Backshift 
Type of unassertability 
signaled 
Epistemic distance between 
speaker and contextually 
given p 
Unassertability of prediction 
because of impossible p 
Type of semantic relation 
between the propositions in 
p and q 
Inferential: p expresses an 
assumption on the basis of 
which the speaker arrives at 
a conclusion in q 
Conditional: p expresses an 
assumption on the basis of 
which the speaker arrives at 
a prediction in q (sequential 
and causal relations between 
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